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ORAL MODIFICATION AND RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS
REQUIRED BY TIRE STATUTE OF FRAUDS TO BE
IN WRITING
Where a particular contract or transaction is required to be in
writing by the Statute of Frauds, the question frequently arises
whether modification or rescission must also be by a writing; or, to
state it differently, whether oral modification or rescission of such a
contract or transaction is effective. The purpose of this note is to
discuss the question primarily from the point of view of the South
Carolina cases. The original English Statute of Frauds, enacted in
1677,1 was made of force in South Carolina in 1712,2 and it is
principally with the sections originally and still commonly known
as the fourth3 and seventeenth 4 sections that this note is concerned.
ORAL M ODIFICATION OP CONTRACTS VITHIN THE STATTr
From even a cursory reading of cases involving oral modification
of contracts within the Statute of Frauds, one can readily see the
1. 29 CAR. 2, c 3 (1677).
2. 2 STAT. 525 (1712).
3. CODE OF LAwS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 11-101. This section reads as
follows:
Agreements to be in writing.
No action shall be brought whereby:
(1) To charge any executor or administrator upon any special promise
to answer damages out of his own estate;
(2) To charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for
the debt, default or miscarriage of another person;
(3) To charge any person upon any agreement made upon considera-
tion of marriage;
(4) To charge any person upon any contract or sale of lands, tene-
ments or hereditaments or any interest in or concerning them; or
(5) To charge any person upon any agreement that is not to be per-
formed within the space of one year from the making thereof;
Unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought or
some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing and signed by the
party to be charged therewith or some person thereunto by him lawfully
authorized.
The present section differs only slightly in verbiage from the original
version of the fourth section.
4. CODE OF LAws oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 11-103. This section reads as
follows, with only minor changes in verbiage from the original seventeenth
section:
Contracts for sale of goods for fifty dollars or more
No contract for the sale of any goods, wares and merchandise for the
price of fifty dollars or upwards shall be allowed to be good unless (a)
the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold and actually receive
the same or give something in earnest to bind the bargain or in part
payment or (b) some note or memorandum in writing of the bargain
be made and signed by the parties to be charged by such contract or
their agents thereunto lawfully authorized.
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necessity for distinguishing that Statute from the parol evidence rule.
The parol evidence rule renders inadmissible all prior or contempora-
neous oral statements which are inconsistent with or tend to vary
the terms of the written contract. This rule does not prevent the
introduction of testimony showing a subsequent oral variance incon-
sistent with or rescinding the prior written contract. 5 Where an
original contract comes within the provisions of the Statute of Frauds
and is thus required to be in writing, the Statute of Frauds renders
unenforceable a subsequent oral contract, which while changing or
varying the terms of the original written contract, yet remains within
the Statute of Frauds.6 Or, to state the rule more simply, a contract
required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing cannot be validly
changed or modified by a subsequent oral contract so as to make the
original written contract as modified an enforceable contract, unless
the modification removes the original contract from within the terms
of the Statute.7
In determining whether the written contract as modified by the
oral contract is within the Statute of Frauds, the contract as modified
". .. is regarded as creating a new single contract consisting of so
many of the terms of the prior contract as the parties have agreed
not to change, and in addition the new terms on which they have
agreed." s If the result is a contract the terms of which are required
by the Statute to be in writing, the oral modification is unenforce-
able.0 If the resulting contract as orally modified is not within the
Statute or if the oral contract is complete within itself and not within
the Statute of Frauds, it is generally enforceable.' 0
South Carolina in numerous decisions has considered and followed
the general rule of non-enforceability of oral modifications of con-
S. Koth v. Board of Education, 141 S. C. 448, 140 S. E. 99 (1927). This
case is also authority for a view contrary to common law that a contract under
seal can be modified or varied by a contract not under seal, or even by an oral
one where it does not contravene the Statute of Frauds. See Lindsay v. Garvin,
31 S. C. 259, 9 S. E. 862 (1889) (land).
6. See Schaap v. Wolf, 173 Wis. 351, 181 N. W. 214, 17 A. L. R. 7 (1921)
(land).
7. See Pence v. Life, 104 Va. 518, 52 S. E. 257 (1905) (land); Whitfield
v. Rowland Lumber Co., 152 N. C. 211, 67 S. E. 512 (1910) (land); Planters
Cotton Oil Co. v. Bell, 54 Ga. App. 433, 188 S. E. 41 (1936) (chattels) ; Rudder
v. Trice, 236 Ala. 234, 182 So. 22 (1938) (not within a year) ; Van Iderstine
Co. v. Barnet Leather Co., 242 N. Y. 425, 152 N. E. 250 (1926) (chattels) ;
Florence Printing Co. v. Parnell, 178 S. C. 119, 182 S. E. 313 (1934) (not
within a year); AxxoTs., 17 A. L. R. 10 (1922), 80 A. L. R. 539 (1932), 118
A. L. R. 1511 (1939).
8. RtSTATEME.NT, CONTRACTS § 223 (1932).
9. See AN xor., 17 A. L. R. 10, 31 (1922).
10. Lieberman v. Templar Motor Co., 236 N. Y. 139, 140 N. E. 222, 29
A. L. R. 1089 (1923) (not within a year).
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tracts which are required to be in writing.31 There are, however,
certain cases which at first glance do not appear to be in harmony
with the general rule.
Perhaps the earliest case in this State dealing with the problem is
Doar v. Gibbes.12 In that case there was a written contract for the
sale of land. The vendee sued for specific performance alleging that
there had been an oral modification extending the time for perform-
ance. The Court denied specific performance and held that an oral
agreement to extend the time for the performance of a written con-
tract for the sale of land was within the Statute of Frauds and
unenforceable. Much later, there was a holding in Williams v. Bruce'3
to the effect that parol evidence could be admitted to show an oral
modification establishing a time for performance of a contract for the
sale of land. The written contract contained no time for perform-
ance. The fifteen-day limitation allegedly established by an oral
modification had expired at the time of this suit for specific perform-
ance. The vendee's bill was denied. Since the Court did not mention
the Statute of Frauds, it is arguable that the holding admitting evi-
dence of the oral modification was based on the parol evidence rule
and admitted for the purpose of establishing a reasonable time for
performance since no time was provided for in the written contract.
Another basis for the decision is the fact that the fifteen day extension
had been executed and could not now be undone.' 4 A third and
very slim possibility is that the decision was based upon the very
controversial theory that the Statute of Frauds applies to the for-
mation of contracts and not to their performance,' 5 though there
11. See Lindsay v. Garvin, 31 S. C. 259, 9 S. E. 862 (1889) (land); Birlant
v. Cleckley, 48 S. C. 298, 26 S. E. 600 (1896) (not within a year) ; O'Neal v.
Bennett, 33 S. C. 243, 11 S. E. 727 (1890) (land); Midland Roofing Co. v.
Pickens, 96 S. C. 286, 80 S. E. 484 (1913) (chattels) ; McLaurin v. Eddins,
114 S. C. 193, 103 S. E. 531 (1920) (land); Florence Printing Co. v. Parnell,
178 S. C. 119, 182 S. E. 313 (1934) (chattels), cited in 118 A. L. R. 1511
(1939) as being in support of the general rule; Doar v. Gibbes, Bailey Eq. 371
(S. C. 1831) (land); Standard Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 64 F. 2d 583 (4th Cir.
1927) (suretyship) ; Southern States Ins. Co. v. Foster, 229 F. 2d 77 (4th Cir.
1956) (not within a year).
12. Bailey Eq. 371 (S. C. 1831).
13. 110 S. C. 421, 96 S. E. 905 (1918).
14. See Alston v. Connell, 140 N. C. 485, 53 S. E. 292 (1906) (land);
Thomson v. Poor, 147 N. Y. 402, 42 N. E. 13 (1895) (not within a year);
Imperator Realty Co. v. Tul, 228 N. Y. 447, 127 N. E. 263 (1920) (land);
Florence Printing Co. v. Parnell, 178 S. C. 119, 182 S. E. 313 (1934) (not
within a year).
15. Professor Williston criticizes this theory saying that it is based on a
principle ". . . which cannot be supported and the current of authority runs
strongly against it." 2 WLrLSToN, CONTRACTS § 599 p. 1717 (Rev. Ed. 1936).
But see Van Iderstine Co. v. Barnet Leather Co., 242 N. Y. 425, 152 N. E.
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is no indication that this theory was even considered and Doar v.
Gibbeslo is clearly opposed to such a view.
In American Oil Co. v. CoX3 7 there was a written lease which by
its terms could be terminated by either party upon presentation
of a twenty-four hour written notice. The plaintiff gave such notice
and, upon defendant's refusal to vacate, brought an action to dis-
possess him. The defendant alleged that the written lease had been
orally modified. The nature of this alleged modification was not
reported. The trial judge excluded testimony with reference to this
modification, and on appeal the Supreme Court said:
Unquestionably, it is true that a written contract may be
changed by a subsequent parol agreement, supported by a
valuable consideration, and evidence is admissible in proof of
such parol agreement.
The report of the case did not show that the lease was originally
for a period greater than a year or that the modification was such as
to require the application of the Statute of Frauds, which was not
mentioned. It is submitted that such sweeping language could refer
only to the parol evidence rule and could not be applicable to the
Statute of Frauds. At any rate, the circuit court was affirmed on the
ground that the exception was not properly raised.
The Supreme Court recently re-affirmed the general rule in Farr
v. Williams.'8 This case concerned a written lease for two years
duration. In an action for one-half of a condemnation award, the
lessor alleged that there had been an oral agreement to extend the
terms of the lease for an additional two year period. The Court held
that an oral agreement would have been invalid in the absence of
such partial performance as would remove the bar of the Statute of
Frauds. 19
The sharpest apparent departure from the general rule is the case
of Searles v. Auld.20 A written contract provided for the delivery of
certain corporate stock in addition to money as consideration for the
sale of the land. The parties orally agreed that the vendor would
accept the vendee's personal note in lieu of the corporate stock. The
vendee made two cash payments and delivered the note. Later, the
vendee tendered the stock in accordance with the terms of the written
16. See note 11 supra.
17. 182 S. C. 419,424,189 S. E. 600 (1937).
18. 232 S. C. 208, 101 S. E. 2d 483 (1958).
19. That case was decided under a different section of the Statute of Frauds,
CoMr. oF LAws OF SOUTr CARoLINA, 1952 § 57-306, but the law is nonetheless
applicable.
20. 118 S. C. 430, 111 S. R. 785 (1921). The Court did not mention the
Statute of Frauds by name.
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contract and demanded return of the note. The vendor refused and
the vendee sued for breach of contract. The vendor set up the oral
modification as a defense. The Court, citing 39 Cyc. 1351 (1912),
held that such a modification could be made by oral contract. This
case can be reconciled by the fact that the oral modification bad been
acted upon and as such was binding. 2 '
As should be expected, the courts, having realized that gross in-
justice would result from a strict application of the general rule
against the enforcement of oral modifications to contracts within the
Statute of Frauds, have applied such equitable remedies as estoppel
and waiver where a party's reliance on an oral modification has re-
sulted in an irretrievable change of position or loss of a legal right.22
The case of Plorence Printing Co. v. Parnell2 3 sums up the general
attitude quite adequately. The circuit court decree as adopted by the
Supreme Court declared:
Equity will not allow the statute of frauds to be used as an
instrument of fraud, and where a party to a contract within the
statute induces the other to waive some provision thereof upon
which he is entitled to insist and to change his position to his
disadvantage with respect thereto, the party so acting will be
estopped to claim the benefit of the statute.
ORAL R9SCISSION OV CONTRACTS WITHIN TH4 STATUTE
oF FRAUDS
The general rule as to oral rescission of contracts within the
Statute of Frauds is that an executory written contract within the
Statute can be effectively rescinded by a subsequent oral contract.
2 4
21. See cases cited in note 14 supra.
22. See McDonald v. Whaley, 244 S. W. 596 (Tex. Com. A pp. 1922) (land);
Planters Cotton Oil Co. v. Bell, 54 Ga. App. 433, 188 S. E. 41 (1936) (chattels) ;
McMillan v. King, 193 S. C. 14, 7 S. E. 2d 521 (1940) (land); Walker v.
Railroad Co., 26 S. C. 80, 1 S. E. 366 (1887) (not within a year) (dictum);
Gee v. Hicks, Rich. Eq. Cas. 17 (S. C. 1831) (not within a year); Southern
States Ins. Co. v. Foster, 229 F. 2d 77 (4th Cir. 1956) (not within a year)
(dictum).
23. 178 S. C. 119, 126, 182 S. E. 313 (1934) (not within a year). There
was a written agreement between the principal stockholders of that printing
company whereby they agreed to equalize their stock holdings. The parties
agreed orally to extend the period for such stock equalization for two or
three additional years. The plaintiff relied on this extension and hence did not
insist on the time specified by the written contract. See also, Alston v. Connell,
140 N. C. 485, 53 S. E. 292 (1906) (land); Thomson v. Poor, 147 N. Y. 402,
42 N. R. 13 (1895) (not within a year); Imperator Realty Co. v. TulI, 228
N. Y. 447, 127 N. E. 263 (1920) (land).
24. See Hooke v. Great Western Lumber Co., 54 Cal. App. 576, 202 Pac.
492 (1921) (chattels) ; Haberman v. Sawall, 72 Cal. App. 576, 237 Pac. 776
(1925) (land); McKinney v. Flanery, 205 Ky. 766, 266 S. V. 629 (1924)
(land) ; Wangsness v. Stephenson, 44 S. D. 536, 184 N. W. 362 (1921) (land) ;
[Vol. 1i
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If the contract is one involving the sale of land or chattels which
exceed fifty dollars in price and has been executed, an attempted
rescission which has the effect of revesting the title in the vendor
is equivalent to a new contract of sale, and as such is within the
Statute of Frauds.
2 5
Where the original contract is executory and deals with the sale
of land or personalty in excess of fifty dollars in price, the oral
rescission presents some problems. 2 6 Both Professor Corbin27 and
Professor Williston,28 as well as the Restatement of Contracts,29
agree that where the original contract was operative not only as a
promise, but as a conveyance of the title in the chattel or of an interest
in the land, and the rescinding contract must operate not only to dis-
charge the obligations but also to reconvey title to the chattel or the
interest in the land, the rescinding oral contract is within the Statute
of Frauds and hence unenforceable.3 0 The basis for this view and
that of a similar strong minority is well illustrated by a passage from
Friar v. Baldridge.3 1 This case concerned a written contract for the
sale of land which was allegedly rescinded by oral agreement. The
Court declared:
A contract for the conveyance of land is a contract respecting
an interest in lands. It creates an equitable estate in the vendee
in the very lands, and makes the vendor a trustee for him. A
contract for the sale of an equitable estate in lands is clearly a
sale of an interest in the land within the statute of frauds ...
[T] he court can perceive no distinction between the sale of land to
which a man has only an equitable title and a sale of land to
which he has a legal title. They are equally within the statute.
The majority of the jurisdictions apparently base their holdings
Hicks v. Oak's Adm'r., 233 Ky. 27, 24 S. W. 2d 917 (1930) (land); 2 WiLris-
TON, CONTRACTS § 592 p. 1703 (Rev. Ed. 1936); 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 302
p. 91 (1950); RtSTATVAMNT, CONTRACTS § 222 (1936); ANNOT., 38 A. L. R.
294 (1925).
25. See Fripp v. Fripp, Rice Eq. 84 (S. C. 1839) (land); Shinall Bros. v.
Skelton, 28 Ga. App. 527, 112 S. E. 163 (1922) (chattels); McDonald v.
Whaley, 244 S. W. 596 (Tex. Com. App. 1922) (land); Anderson v. Anderson,
128 Wash. 504, 223 Pac. 323, 38 A. L. R. 292 (1924) (land); 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 592 p. 1704 (Rev. Ed. 1936); 2 CoRni, CONTRACTS § 302 p. 92
(1950).
26. See 11 N. Y. U. INTRA MURAL L. REV. 43 (1955).
27. See note 25 supra.
28. Ibid.
29. RnSTATEmNT, CONTRACTS § 222, Ills. 2 and 3 (1932).
30. See Sonborn v. Murphy, 86 Tex. 437, 25 S. W. 610 (1894) (land);
Anderson v. Anderson, 128 Wash. 504, 223 Pac. 323, 38 A. L. R. 292 (1924)
(land) ; Hardinger v. Till, 1 Wash. 2d 335, 96 P. 2d 262 (1939) (land);
Maxon v. Gates, 112 Wis. 196, 88 N. W. 54 (1901) (land).
31. 91 Ark. 133, 120 S. W. 989, 992 (1909).
1959]
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on a theory similar to that expressed by the court in Niernbcrg v.
Feld :32
It seems to be the better-reasoned rule that an executory con-
tract involving title to, or an interest in, lands may be rescinded
by an agreement resting in parol. The Statute of Frauds con-
cerns the making of contracts only, and does not apply to the
manner of their revocation.
Both logic and reason would appear to lie with the minority view as
so aptly expressed in Friar v. Baldridge,a a especially since the Statute
of Frauds refers to "any interest" in land. The majority seems to
-ignore legal theory and relies on expediency.
The law in South Carolina seems, however, to be well settled in
its approval of the general rule allowing oral rescissions of executory
contracts in general, and also in its approval of the majority view
as to oral rescissions of contracts pertaining to the sale of land and
chattels.
A very early case, Fripp v. Fripp,34 established the rule in so far
as land is concerned. The plaintiff and defendant made mutual assign-
ments in writing of certain realty devised to them. The result of this
transaction was that each took possession of a tract of land, though
the Court held that they did not acquire a legal interest thereby.
Later, there was an alleged oral offer to rescind this agreement. De-
fendant contends that he accepted this offer two years after receiving
it. The Court held that the offer was not accepted within a reasonable
time, and then stated:
Though property once legally vested cannot be re-transferred
without a conveyance, yet an agreement may be rescinded by
parol or by an act significant of the intention, as by cancelling
a bond or giving it up to be cancelled.
The rule is unequivocally stated in Moseley v. Witt35 under the
authority of Fripp v. Fripp.3 6 The plaintiff sought specific perform-
ance of a written contract for the sale of land. The defense was an
oral rescission of that contract and the substitution of a rent con-
tract. The Court declared: "A written contract of sale may be res-
32. 131 Colo. 508, 283 P. 2d 640 (1955). See McIntosh v. Goodwin, 292
S. W. 2d 242 (Tenn. App. 1954) (land); San Rogue Properties v. Pierce, 18
Cal. App. 2d 397, 63 P. 2d 1198 (1937) (land) ; 2 CoRBIN, COrTaACrS § 3021p. 93
(1950); Annot., 38 A. L. P. 292, 294 (1925) citing Moseley v. Witt, 79 S. C.
141, 60 S. E. 520 (1907) (land) and Lewis v. Cooley, 81 S. C. 461, 62 S. B.
868 (1908) (land).
33. 91 Ark. 133, 120 S. W. 989 (1909).
34. Rice Eq. 84, 108 (S. C. 1839).
35. 79 S. C. 141, 60 S. E. 520 (1907).
36. Rice Eq. 84 (S. C. 1839).
[Vol. 11
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cinded and a rent contract substituted by parol.
' '
37 It will be noted,
however, that the Court made no mention of the fact that equitable
title might have passed on execution of the contract.
The rule as to oral rescissions of contracts for the sale of personal
property at a price in excess of fifty dollars is perspicuously set out
in Midland Roofing Co. v. Pickens.38 The plaintiff sued for goods
sold and delivered. The defense was an oral rescission of the contract
and the substitution of an agreement to receive them upon consign-
ment. The chattels were destroyed by fire while in the defendant's
possession. Under the authority of Moseley v. Witt,39 it was held
that a written contract for the sale of chattels of a value in excess of
fifty dollars could be rescinded orally. In that case, however, the
contract was rescinded before the goods had been delivered or title
to them had passed to the vendee.
CONCLIUSION
The general rule that oral modifications of contracts required to be
in writing by the Statute of Frauds are unenforceable is well estab-
lished and supported by reason and the authorities. On the whole,
South Carolina is in agreement with the general rule. With the pos-
sible exception of Searles v. Auld,40 any divergence from that
general rule can be easily distinguished or reconciled. That case may
be out of line, but can possibly be harmonized under the facts.
South Carolina is in complete agreement with the general rule that
contracts within the Statute of Frauds may be rescinded orally.
South Carolina also accepts the majority view in allowing oral rescis-
sions of executory contracts for the sale of land and chattels where
the price exceeds fifty dollars, at least in the later case if title has
not passed, and possibly if it has.
ROBMRT B. WALLACE.
37. Accord: Lewis v. Cooley, 81 S. C. 461, 62 S. E. 868 (1908) (land) ; cf.,
R~ay v. Counts, 82 S. C. 555, 64 S. E. 1135 (1909) (land) (semble).
38. 96 S. C. 286, 80 S. R. 484 (1913).
39. 79 S. C. 141, 60 S. E. 520 (1907).
40. 118 S. C. 430, 111 S. E. 785 (1921).
1959]
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